INTRODUCTION This Article uses the dialectical ideas of German philosopher Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1833) in application to the progression of United States voting laws since the founding. This analysis can be used to interpret past progression of voting rights in the US as well as a provoking way to predict the future trends in US voting rights.
First, Hegel's dialectical method is established as a major premise. 1 1 This paper employs the language of "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" and the dialectical method as a simplified paradigm of Hegel's complex thoughts of "aufheben." A law and Hegelian scholar, Michael H. Hoffheimer explains the detailed distinction between dialectic and "aufheben":
Hegel himself does not use the terms "dialectic" or "dialectical" very often. They appear only three times in the sections on philosophy of law in the first edition of his Encyclopedia (1817) . That text refers to the dialectical conflict among various duties --a conflict that lacks any resolution. It refers to "true dialectic" as constituting the subject that knows its subordination under another. And it terms the "justice of the world" as the representation (darstellt) of the dialectic of spirits of particular peoples. None of these passages apply the term "dialectic" to the transcendental resolution of an opposition or to the move to a new phase or level of the system.
The term Hegel employs most frequently to denote the transcending resolution of oppositions, contradictions and conflicts, is "aufheben." Variously translated as "transcend," "supersede," or "sublimate," the term "aufheben" is best translated by the neologism "sublate." Unlike "dialectic," the term "sublation" figures prominently in important transitions in Hegel's system. It occurs twice in the first, cryptic section of Hegel's philosophy of law from 1817: Second, the general accepted history of United States voting laws from the 1770s to the current day is laid out as a minor premise. Third, the major premise of Hegel's dialectical method weaves and applies itself to the progression of United States voting laws to explain the progression. This third Objective spirit is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit. Free will for itself appears in the form of free will now that the formalism, contingency, and subjectivity of its practical activity is sublated. Through the sublation of this mediation, spirit becomes the unmediated selfposited particularity, which in the form of universal is freedom itself.
Other passages apply the term "sublation" to express the overcoming of contradiction and to describe the resolution of a progress in a third judgment. Unlike the term "dialectic," "sublation" denotes resolution of an unmediated opposition into a higher category --a resolution that marks the movement to a new level of the system. Thus, Hegel applies the term "sublation" in the 1817 philosophy of law to the resolution or mediation of unmediated existence and unmediated singularity. In the final appearance of the term "sublation" in the philosophy of law, a mediated relationship is itself overcome or resolved into the higher category of order based on custom.
It is thus the term "sublation," not "dialectic" or "thesis-synthesisantithesis," that is linked most closely to distinctive, transcending features of Hegel's treatment of conflict and contradiction. Hegel did not coin the term "aufheben." Vernacular meanings in the eighteenth century included to pick up, to preserve, and to cancel. Commentaries always emphasize that he used the term "sublation" with the double meaning of both to cancel and to preserve, referring to the reconciliation of an opposition in a manner that somehow both cancels and preserves the opposed elements at a higher level. But the term also had technical meanings. In mathematics, it meant to reduce a fraction. In law, it meant to repeal or annul a statute. Hegel was not the first to import the term into philosophy or legal philosophy. His friend Schelling employed the term widely throughout his early writings, and notably in his New Deduction of Natural Law (1796), but Schelling almost always used the term "aufheben" in the univocal sense of "to cancel." Similarly, some of Hegel's followers returned to this more vernacular use of the term.
Michael H. Hoffheimer, Hegel's First Philosophy of Law, 62 TENN. L. REV. 823, 839-842 (1995) step of application suggests possible future scenarios. Hegel's first published work was a translation and commentary on the French letters of Jean-Jacques Cart that were critical of Bern constitutional law. This work has not been translated. For a discussion, see H.S. Harris, Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801 418-34 (1972) . Hegel conceived of law as part of his system from at least 1800; it is expressly included in many unpublished drafts of his system and is implicitly assumed to be part of his system in incomplete drafts of his system. REV. 823, 829 n.24 (1995) .) Hegel, The Philosophy of History, ... Hegel repeats this thesis in his conclusion. See id. at 412-57. See also Acton, supra note 47, at 443 (noting that for Hegel, "world history is not wholly an affair of chance or contingency;" rather "the history of the world has a rational structure," and "this rational structure … is the development of freedom") and 446 (stating that "Hegel considered that the history of the human race is a development from less to greater freedom and from less adequate forms of freedom to illustrates the dialectic rule by his discussion of ruler and those who are ruled, 'L L. 159, 184 n.93 (1997) 9 This process is often referred to as guided by the "Geist":
"Michael A. Simon states: History for Hegel is an unfolding of the Geist or spirit as it objectifies itself in the world. Spirit actualizes itself by making things happen, and is at the same time conscious of itself. . . . History is the story of the development of human freedom; it is freedom becoming objective, which means that the world is brought into conformity with the rational system of mind. The system of right--that is to say, the law--represents the rational principles that determine the constraints that operate on what free-willing existents can will at a particular moment of history. In revealed religion self-consciousness is aware of itself in pictorial objective form, not as yet as self-consciousness. It must cancel this form and become aware of itself in all the forms it has hitherto taken up. They must not merely be forms of self-consciousness for us, the phenomenological observers, but for self-consciousness itself. It must see how it has externalised itself in various objects, and in seeing this also cancelled the externalisation. It must see all its objective forms as itself. 
II. WAYS HEGEL'S DIALECTIC HAS BEEN USED BEFORE:
Hegel's dialectic has been used and disused in many ways since his writing in the early 1800s. , 1990) . 17 Hegel explained: Philosophy forms a circle. It has an initial or immediate point -for it must begin somewhere -a point which is not demonstrated and is not a result. But the starting point of philosophy is immediately relative, for it must appear at another end-point as a result. Philosophy is a sequence which is not suspended in mid-air; it does not begin immediately, but is rounded off within itself.
Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Nisbet), at 26 (footnote omitted). 18 An antithesis does not necessarily imply a negative connotation, but rather an opposite state of affairs from the thesis. (1690) (All these promises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that which is held to be the fountain of all power, "Adam′s private dominion and paternal jurisdiction"; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition, and rebellion (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against), must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, 
C. Jeffersonian Democracy and Antebellum Period:
After the birth of the nation by the early 1790s, the primary people who could voter were white men with property. This excluded AfricanAmericans, women, and white men without property. 
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Although by the law the right to vote had significantly expanded, movements began to curtail black involvement while simultaneously female suffrage movement gained progress.
E. Jim Crow era and Female Suffrage:
However, this expansion of the right to vote with the 15th In 1971 the 26th Amendment gave the right to vote for individuals (1954 First Impressions, 76, 80 (2010) .
59 Comm'n on Fed. Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections 18,19 (2005) between 18 and 21 years of age. This rule originated from the problems associated with the Vietnam War: if soldiers were young enough to die for the country, they should be able to vote.
60 Surprisingly unlike most former situations this has not had much backlash yet, and many elections sway on the number of young people voting. Current issues include many state legislatures have voted in voter ID laws. Indeed, many argue that the voter ID law is to protect voter integrity and is not a step backward; it still has the effect of restricting some people who would otherwise be qualified to vote as citizens from voting. 
G. Promises at the same time:
Although voting restrictions existed in the 1790s; the voting restrictions were slowly chipped away at through the next century and a half.
Simultaneous to all these voting law restrictions were promises of equality as laid out in the Declaration of Independence and the goal of the country for all men to be created equal with equal rights. The progression of getting rid of these restrictions can be seen as the attempt to reach the goal of the Declaration's statement "all men are created equal" to including all humans. Giving people the right to vote seemed to be one of the cornerstones for achieving "equality."
Indeed, each step forward had its steps backwards, but overall there has been a significant progression from merely white men with property voting to, in theory, all US citizens.
Assuming voting rights is an expression of equality, as each ballot is worth one vote, then manifesting that right establishes one's equality.
ANALYSIS:
A. Summary of Argument:
Here, Hegel's dialectical method can be used to interpret the progression of US voting rights from exclusive to inclusive. The ruler is analogous to the powers that have the right to vote, and the populace is the people without the right to vote. These roles shift over time, and are not the same set of people.
The thesis is white men with property exercising the right to vote. The antithesis is the movement of the populace other than white men with property to gain the right to vote. Finally the synthesis is yet to be attained.
The 
B. Situation of Voting at Founding Analyzed through Hegelian Dialectic:
The underlying policy behind the original thesis was that only property owners had a stake in what policies were enacted. A version of this stake in the governance can be seen in Patrick Henry's famous, "no taxation without representation," phrase. This meant that the colonists felt they needed adequate representation in the English Parliament to be taxed. Likewise the property owners felt they were the only ones who needed representation, because they were taxed on property and had much to lose. Alternatively, the policy for expanding the right to vote was another version of "no taxation without representation. The white men without property, women, and African Americans felt they had a stake in the governance, because they were subject to the laws of the land. Given that they were subject to the laws enacted by elected officials, they should have the right to vote.
In concordance with the dialectic, the ruler starts off with the birth of the nation as the white men with property, and the rest of the population is the ruled person, which includes slaves, women, and white men without property.
In a sense, white men with property can be said to have had the 
C. Jeffersonian Democracy and Antebellum Period Analyzed through Hegelian Dialectic:
The first changing steps in the voting rights dialectic occurred with white men without property gaining the right to vote. This can be explained by the white men with property sensing a threat from the other white male populace and thereby trying to bring the others under more control. Initially this began with simple brutality to force obedience, such as Shay's Rebellion in 1786 and 1787 and the Whiskey Rebellion in 1791-1794, but the force could only be so effective.
The thesis existed in the 1790s and the time prior to Jacksoniandemocracy and universal white male suffrage, even though the wheels of change were in motion. The thesis was white men with property. The beginning of the synthesis in United States was the movement for universal white male suffrage, based in ideas of equality for all people.
The ruler and the populace begin their movements as a synthesis. The white men with property sought to bring the populace under control by inwardizing them. This can also be interpreted as the white men with property wanting to secure their power by giving the franchise to white men without property to gain the latest vote. The rulers begin by expanding the right to vote throughout the nation, primarily by repealing property restrictions on voting.
D. Civil War and Aftermath Analyzed through Hegelian Dialectic:
The universal white male suffrage leads to a newly defined set for On the other hand, those fighting for the right to vote arguably were not trying to support the current politicians expanding the right to vote, but rather trying to gain equal footing and having a say in the laws they were subject to under the elected officials.
The people originally subject to these voting restrictions over time realized the externality of a promise of equality. This promise of equality as exhibited by the ability to vote becomes more apparent as each step of voting occurs.
In the 1820s when all white men regardless of property could vote, it became more apparent to women and African Americans (especially freed slaves) the magnitude of this right. The people and citizens of the US desired to inwardize, in Hegelian terms, these promises of equality as exhibited by voting rights. The Hegelian dialectic can be used to explain the progression of United
PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE:

Dialectical Analysis of US Voting Laws
States Voting Rights from exclusive to more inclusive. Ultimately, the dialectic sits in the larger dialectic of history rationally moving towards a more democratic system of government.
Several points can be predicted for the future. First, given that history has moved towards a more democratic and equal society over time, it likely will continue to strive towards more equality in regards to voting rights and expanding the electorate. As a counter argument, it would seem that just because events have always gone a certain way, does not mean they will continue to do so.
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Indeed to support this counter argument, a speech by Abraham Lincoln in 1858 where he suggests slavery would have died out had the cotton gin not been invented. He says that some people in the 1850s were saying "all men are created equal" at the time was interpreted as all men but back in the 1770s it really was interpreted as just white men so we should be closer to the founding fathers time and keep slavery, but Lincoln points out that actually the economic progress due to the cotton gin made slavery more profitable than it was at the founding probably more people in their own time in the 1850s interpret "all men are created equal" to mean just white men more than it used to be in the 1770s. 66 However, to distinguish this counterargument, the dialectic does not describe a linear progression in history, but rather incorporates backwards and forward movements, hence the spiral metaphor.
Second, the voting rights dialectic examined in this Article is likely part of a greater dialectic, not merely starting in 1776, and is analogous to Francis Fukuyama's dialectic between liberal-democratic-economic systems compared to communist systems.
Third, it would seem that the dialectical method can be applied to many scenarios and Hegel's method can be applied to a wide variety of law areas. 823, 825-827 (1995) .
